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The Failed Promise of Foreign Direct Investment: Some Remarks on ‘Malign’ 
Investment and Political Instability in Former Soviet States 
 
Abstract 
The policy of key international organisation continues to be informed by the assumption that 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has an unambiguously positive effect on recipient nations.  
However, there is increasing evidence that, on a global scale, increased trade and investment 
flows from rich to poorer nations have not contributed to a convergence of levels of income and 
well-being.  This is particularly apparent in the context of former Soviet states, many of which 
continue to experience a decline, in both relative and absolute terms, in per capita GDP alongside 
a diminution in the life expectancy of their populations.  Examining data on FDI received by former 
Soviet States from 1997 to 2005, this paper notes, firstly, that these investments have been 
concentrated on a few, typical natural-resource-rich states.  Secondly, it observes that even these 
resource-rich countries experienced massive fluctuations in terms of the amounts of FDI they 
received over this time period.   Lastly, the paper examines the impact of FDI on a number of 
country risk indicators via a pooled regression model which includes data for twelve former Soviet 
countries, namely the Central and Eastern European States of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and 
Ukraine, and the Central Asian Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  This analysis indicates that FDI has either a marginally 
negative effect on individual country risk measures such as in the case of ‘Overall Country Risk’, or 
significantly negative effects as in the case of ‘Economic Risk’ and ‘Legal Risk’.  The paper 
concludes that there is strong case for questioning the existing orthodoxy which argues that 
problems of transition can be overcome via increased FDI and which continues to advise former 
Soviet states to pursue foreign capital at all cost.   
 
 
Deleted: ?
 3
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this paper is to question the dominant orthodoxy of FDI which suggests that increased 
foreign investment will, in virtually all instances, benefit the recipient nation.  This orthodox has an 
extensive academic pedigree (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford, 1996; Borensztein, De 
Gregorio and Lee, 1998; De Melo, 1999; Dyker, 1999)  which loosely underpins a well established 
policy discourse which emphasises ‘the creation of a positive investment climates’ and the need to 
‘create institutions which are complementary to investment’ (Guisinger, 1985; Mudambi and 
Navarra, 2002).  Implied in this orthodoxy is the assumption that, firstly, the failure by certain 
regions to exhibit sustained growth can be attributed to a lack of?ability to attract foreign 
investment, and, secondly, that the inability to attract lasting foreign investment, itself, can be 
attributed to institutional deficiencies of the potential recipient country.   Applied to former Soviet 
states, other than the Baltics, this narrative typically identifies corruption, lack of legal and 
institutional reforms and insufficient liberalisation as root cause for the insufficiency of economic 
and social development in these countries (Estrin, Hughes and Todd, 1997; Fabry and Zeghni, 
2002; Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004).   
 
One of the obvious weaknesses of this narrative is that it oversimplifies the experiences of 
different countries within larger regions.  Thus, there is significant evidence that, contrary to the 
assumption that the entire region has been an FDI laggard,  FDI in former Soviet states has been 
highly concentrated in a number of countries which rank, by international standards, amongst the 
top FDI recipients (Meyer and Pind, 1999).  Moreover, there is no consistent evidence that the top 
FDI recipients amongst former Soviet states also rank at the top in terms of social and institutional 
development and/or political stability (Abbott, 2002; Abbott and Beck, 2003). Lastly, there are 
some, largely qualitative analyses, which suggest that some countries which have been targeted 
by FDI have in fact experienced a deterioration in their institutional capacities (Marriott and Muttitt, 
2005).   
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As an alternative to these conventional views on FDI, this paper examines the possibility that 
foreign investment in former Soviet states has not only failed to produce the expected effects, but 
also may have had a discernibly negative impact on certain regions.   The paper is structured as 
follows.  The first section briefly reviews conventional arguments on the benefits of trade and 
investment and contrasts these with recent developments in the region.  The second section 
presents a more recent neo-institutionalist model of economic development together with some 
alternative interpretations of the impact of investment and trade on domestic economies.   These 
alternative views form the basis for the empirical analysis of section three, which focuses on the 
link between  investment flows in former Soviet states from the late 1990s to mid 2000 and levels 
of stability amongst these states, and highlights the potentially negative effect foreign investment 
may have had on the region.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of 
these findings. 
 
CONVENTIONAL VIEWS ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT  
Since the 1970s, much of the literature on economic growth has focused on the question as to 
why the ‘West’ has been able to accumulate significant amounts of wealth while other regions of 
the world suffer from comparable poverty (Lucas, 1988).   Up until the mid 1990s this issue was 
widely disputed, not least on account of the different disciplinary approaches which contributed to 
this debate.  However, partly due to the influence of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
and World Trade Organisation, a new consensus formed in the 1990s which emphasised trade as a 
principal source of wealth, and argued that the economies of wealthy nations could be 
distinguished from poorer ones primarily on account of their greater participation in world trade.  
Implicit in this new orthodox was a barely hidden policy agenda which advocated, for various 
reasons, the lifting of trade barriers and the expansion of global trade.  Academically the new 
orthodoxy was underpinned most eloquently by the works of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warners, 
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whose 1995 Brookings Paper  Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,  stated 
categorically that “.. Countries that are open to trade … experience unconditional convergence to 
the income levels of rich countries”.  Apart from underpinning Sachs’ unquestionably disastrous 
role in advising the collapsing Soviet Union on matters of economic restructuring, this view formed 
the groundwork for a host of policy initiatives which advocated the integration of transition and 
developed countries in the world economy as a means of combating poverty.   
 
While political support for this orthodoxy has been strong, it has never been fully accepted 
amongst mainstream economists.  Thus Rodrik’s (2003) review of the literature on gains from 
foreign trade concluded that the evidence was clear that “trade yields relatively small income gains 
which do not translate into persistently higher growth”.  In as far as evidence for the positive 
effects of participation in trade and foreign investment was concerned, economists found that 
those directly employed by foreign companies experienced some, albeit fairly limited, welfare 
benefits.  For instance, Aitkin, Harrison and Lipsey (1996) noted that foreign firms operating in 
developing countries tended to pay higher wages than indigenous firms; which they attributed to 
the possible application of superior technology.  Similarly, Budd, Konings and Slaughter’s (2004) 
investigation of multinational firms, led them to conclude that these firms engaged in patterns of 
rent sharing where the greater profitability of the parent company gave rise to  higher wages.  
However, another study by Konings (2004) concluded that the employment effects of FDI itself 
were generally limited, primarily because employment relocation was mainly taking place between 
trans-national company parents which were located in similar, high-wage, countries.   A study by 
Pavlinek (2002) on acquisitions and joint venture agreement in Central Europe was even more 
pessimistic in that it concluded that these activities did not result in improvements in employment 
conditions, but rather in the introduction of more effective managerial control and measures to 
enhance labour discipline (see also Woolfson and Beck; 2004).   
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While many of employment and wage effects of FDI suggest caution with regard to Sachs’ 
proposition, it is on the level of aggregate data that the pro-trade/foreign investment hypothesis 
appears to suffer its greatest weaknesses.   Although there is evidence of a long term, albeit 
inconsistent, growth in trade volumes over at least the last three decades, most historical studies 
of growth across regions find no evidence of an ‘unconditional narrowing’ of global income  
differentials.   As one of the most comprehensive and thorough studies of long-term world income 
distribution, Maddisons’s (2001) book The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective, instead 
strikingly observes an increase in inequality, in which the positions of ‘Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR’ and ‘Africa’ have markedly deteriorated (see Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1) Interregional spread of per capita GDP (in USD, PPP, source Maddison, 2001, p. 126) 
      1950  1973  1998 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Western Europe     4,594  11,534  17,921 
US, Canada, Australia, NZ         (1)  9,288  16,172  26,146 
Japan      1,926  11,439  20,413 
Asia (excl Japan)            (2)     635      1,231      2,936 
Latin America     2,554         4,531      5,795  
Eastern Europe & former USSR (3)  2,601      5,729      4,354 
Africa               (4)     852      1,365               1,368 
World wide average    2,114      4,104               5,709 
Ratio (1) to (2) Asia    14.5:1     13.1:1                8.9:1 
Ratio (1) to (3) EE&USSR    3.6:1      2.8:1                6.0:1 
Ratio (1) to (4) Africa    10.9:1     11.8:1              19.1:1 
 
 
Although Maddison’s classification of ‘US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand’ into one group is 
perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive, his aggregate data permit some useful comparisons (see also 
Deleted:   
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Berger, 2006 who discusses this data in some detail).  Particularly interesting, in the light of the 
claim of ‘unconditional convergence’ are comparisons between the richest group (1) including the 
of ‘US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand’ with the three non-Western groups ‘Asia’ (2), ‘Eastern 
Europe and former USSR’ (2) and ‘Africa’ (3).  Of these three groups only ‘Asia’ (2) experienced a 
significant reduction in income inequality from  14.5 to 1, to a still sizable 8.9 to 1 as compared to 
the richest group from the period from 1950 to 1998.  ‘Eastern Europe and the former USSR’ (2), 
by contrast experienced an initial narrowing of its income differential to group (1) from 3.6 to 1, to 
2.8 to 1 during the period from 1950 to 1973.  From 1973 to 1998, however, the income 
differential of the ‘Eastern Europe and former USSR’ (2) group relative to the richest group more 
than doubled from 2.8 to 1 in 1973 to 6.0 to 1 in 1998.   Although it can be reliably argued that 
‘Asia’ experienced a massive expansion of trade during this period, the pro-trade argument breaks 
down when we consider that the ‘Eastern Europe and former USSR’ and ‘Africa’ groups also 
experienced increased trade and integration in the world economy.   On the basis of aggregate 
data, then, there is not only evidence of a recent increase global polarisation, but also of trade 
having a polarising effect on at least two regions.   
 
That this widening of income differential is not merely a matter of academic debate and economic 
data is perhaps best illustrated by linking this analysis to the, by now, well known phenomenon of 
the Russian mortality crisis.  This data is reproduced in Table 2, not so much to illustrate the 
shocking decline of life expectancy among Russian males and the still quite pronounced decline 
among female which had occurred by 1994, but to point to the lesser known fact that the situation 
had not improved significantly by 2000.    
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Table 2) 
Life expectancy in Russia and other countries (from Gavrilova, Semyonova and Evudkushkina, 2002, p. 20) 
Country    Year    Life expectancy at birth  
        Males  Females 
 
Russia     1991   63.5  74.3 
     1992   62.0  73.8  
1993 58.9  71.9 
1994   57.6  71.2 
     1995   58.3  71.7 
1996 59.8  72.5 
1997 60.8  72.9 
1998   61.3  72.6 
1999   59.9  72.4 
2000   58.8  71.7 
India     1994-1997  62.4  63.4 
China     1994-1997  69.0  73.0 
US     1994-1997  73.6  79.4 
Source Goskomstat, WHO 
 
 
While the simultaneous occurrence of increased income inequality of the ‘Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR’ with the Russian mortality crisis is at least suggestive of a link, it would, of course, 
be difficult to draw direct causal connections.   What is worth pointing out, however, is that there 
are several analyses which illustrate a close connection between the worsening economic position 
of the region post 1990 and indicators of well–being.  One particularly striking study, conducted by 
Mesle and Vallin (2002), for instance, illustrates that, whereas in 1965 a ranking of male life 
expectancy included a mix of western and eastern nations, by 1995 a clear dichotomy had 
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occurred in which the top portion of the table was occupied  exclusively by western nations, while 
the bottom was occupied by eastern ones (see Figure 1). 
 
 
  
Taking into account these, and other, sources of evidence it is perhaps no overstatement to argue 
that the recent two decades of trade liberalisation have brought few tangible benefits to Eastern 
Europe and Russia as a region.   What is more difficult to answer is the question as to whether 
trade liberalisation itself has damaged the region.  To contextualise this question into a broader 
debate, the next section will review more recent neo-institutionalist theories of trade together with 
some of their more radical alternatives.  
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NEO-INSTITUTIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Contemporary theoretical approaches to the impact of trade on development no longer take an 
unambiguously positive role of trade and investment for granted.   In particular there is now a 
broader acknowledgement of the fact that institutional structures mediate the impact of trade and 
investment.  However, within this literature a number of micro-narratives continue to suggest that 
trade and investment are linked to increased growth and prosperity, even to the extent of having a 
‘unambiguously’ positive impact on existing institutional structures.     Specifically, the literature 
continues to recognise three mechanisms which allegedly create benefits from trade and 
investment.  These include, firstly, strategic modernisation which describes a process where the 
recipient country gains access to the know-how and finance necessary to update equipment and 
bring about strategic restructuring together with an imposition of efficient corporate governance 
(Blanchard, 1997).  Secondly, trade and investment are expected to create positive externalities 
which extend to a process where the introduction of new products and processes by foreign firms 
creates spillovers for the domestic economy (Teece, 1977).    Lastly, and perhaps most 
controversially, increased trade and investment are expected to result in hardening budget 
constraints, where foreign participation in firms reduces financial links of local firms with 
government organisations, allowing central government to impose harder budget constraints and 
improve performance (Dewartipont and  Maskin, 1995; Roland 2000). 
 
At their core, neo-institutionalist narratives on trade and economic growth suggest that the 
integration of an economy into the work market cannot alone explain growth.  Rather, growth is, 
apart from obvious factor endowments, dependent on the interaction of three factors, namely; i) 
participation in trade, ii) institutional development and iii) existing productive capacity (Rodrik, 
2003).  According to Rodrik, the income level of a country is dependent on its factor endowments 
which, in turn, are determined by the availability of physical and human capital.  However, the 
effect of these factor endowments is mediated by economies’ levels of  productivity.  In other 
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words, economies with similar levels of physical and human capital can differ significantly in terms 
of their wealth and growth potential on account of different levels of productivity.  In Rodrik’s 
model (see Figure 2) factor endowments and productivity are ‘endogenous.’  The elements which 
establish these endogenous levels of factor endowments and productivity include trade and 
institutions, which Rodrik describes as being ‘partly endogenous.’  In other words, the positive 
effect which trade is likely to have on an economy depends in part on the absorptive capacity of 
institutions, with institutions having a more pronounced influence on income levels than trade (see 
also Rodrik, Subramian and Trebbi, 2001).  Ultimately, therefore, the principal source of wealth for 
an economy is its productivity, albeit that improvements in a country’s trade position can lead to 
improvements in its institutional make-up, which, in turn, positive affect the crucial parameter of 
productivity.  Lastly, both trade and factor endowments are affected by a country’s geography 
which, as exogenous factor, can play a key role in shaping a national economy’s competitive 
position.  
 
In terms of its policy implications Rodrik’s model represents a limited, but not insignificant, 
deviation from Sach’s orthodoxy on at least two counts.  Firstly, it suggest that trade is not 
sufficient to initiate growth through productivity enhancement, if institutional structures are 
deficient.  Secondly, is an implicit assumption that trade and foreign investment are likely to have 
a impact on both institutional developments and only indirectly on productive capacity (see plus 
signs in Figure 2). 
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 Figure 2) Rodrik’s model of income generation 
Income 
 
                                                                        + 
Endogenous       factor endowments  productivity 
                                                            +       + 
 
Partly                                                                     + 
endogenous     trade       +  institutions 
 
 
Exogenous                                  geography 
 
 
 
While Rodrik’s model and similar neo-institutionalist narratives on income and growth have their 
appeal, particularly when compared with earlier uncritical assumptions with regard to the benefits 
of international trade, they have struggled to find convincing empirical support.  Rodrik’s own 
(2003) work entitled The Search for Prosperity, purports to include case studies in support of the 
model’s core assumptions.  Accordingly, the book includes fourteen country studies which are 
meant to illustrate how the interaction of institutions and trade either created, or failed to create, 
prosperity.   Interestingly, none of these country examples include a post-Soviet country.  
Examples of a successful translation of trade into wealth include Australia, India, Botswana, 
Vietnam, Mauritius, Venezuela, Poland, China and Mexico.  Examples of largely unsuccessful 
absorption of trade include the Philippines, Indonesia, Romania andBolivia, with Pakistan 
representing an ‘undecided’.   While it is futile to unpick these arguments at any length, it is 
probably worth mentioning that Botswana’s economy recently faced a near complete collapse, 
triggered partly by its close economic ties with Zimbabwe.  Similarly, Venezuela, despite its oil 
wealth underwent a major economic crisis in mid 2000 which brought a socialist government to 
power.  The Philippines, Indonesia and Romania, rather than being condemned to hopeless 
underperformance, meanwhile, appear to experience moderate economic growth.   
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The fact that applications of neo-institutionalist models of growth do not perform unambiguously 
well when applied to concrete case studies, needless to say, does not necessarily discredit this 
intellectual enterprise.  What is perhaps more troubling are other issues which include the fact that, 
as a theory, Rodrik’s model is potentially overdetermined.  In other words, it offers an opportunity  
to explain the absence or presence of trade-induced growth on the basis of institutional 
weaknesses, while institutional stagnation or development, in turn, can be linked to the presence 
of absence of trade.  This offers the very real possibility that virtually any event or development 
with regard to a country’s economic fate can be explained on the basis of at least some of the 
elements of the model.  Perhaps even more troublesome, is the fact that the model ignores a 
significant intellectual tradition which views, and has viewed, trade as a potentially detrimental 
force in as far as the institutional, social and political development of developing and transition 
nations is concerned.   
 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine this alternative literature at any level of 
detail, it perhaps worth briefly mentioning some of its key milestones.  Economists first voiced 
concerns over the impact of trade and investment on lesser developed economies in connection 
with the, largely continental, imperialism debate of the early 20th century.  At the time an intense 
debate took place among leftist intellectuals who examined the instability of contemporary 
advanced capitalist systems and highlighted the economic role of colonialism and imperial 
expansionism as practised by the main European powers and the US (see e.g., Luxemburg’s The 
Accumulation of Capital, originally published in 1913 and Bukharin’s, Imperialism and the World 
Economy, originally published in 1916).  Bukharin’s work in particular hypothesised that export of 
capital by heavily industrialised nations  would lead to the subjugation of the economic interests of 
the recipient country.  In chapter seven of his Imperialism and the World Economy, Bukharin 
stated:   
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Looked upon from the point of view of the spreading of the organisational forms of modern 
capital, capital export is nothing but a seizure and a monopolisation of new spheres of 
capital investment by the monopoly enterprises of a great nation or - taking the process as 
a whole - by the organised "national" industry, by "national" finance capital. Capital export 
is the most convenient method for the economic policy of finance groups; it subjugates 
new territories with the greatest ease. 
 
In the 1970s a number of researchers attempted to re-examine earlier notions of imperialism 
within a structuralist context, with a view toward explaining the persistence of underdevelopment 
within certain regions.  In his, at the time, widely read paper A Structural Theory of Imperialism, 
Galtung (1971) proposed a concept of ‘core and periphery’ in which Core, or industrialised, nations 
established core areas within the Periphery, or developing nations, in order to facilitate trade.  
According to Galtung, this core and periphery system superficially benefited both Core and 
Periphery nations, while, at a deeper level, sustaining a type of unequal trade and exchange which 
Galtung described as imperialism or structural violence.  Specifically Galtung (1971, p.81) noted 
that: 
 
Imperialism will be conceived as a dominance relation between collectives—particularly 
between nations.  It is a? sophisticated type of dominance relation which cuts across 
nations, basing itself on a bridgehead which the center of the Center [sic] nation 
establishes in the center of the Periphery [sic] nation, for the benefit of both.  … Briefly 
stated, imperialism is a system that splits up collectives and relates some of the parts to 
each in relations of harmony of interests, and other parts in relations of disharmony of 
interest, or conflict of interest. 
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While Galtung’s analysis was primarily concerned with the role Western economic activity played in 
fermenting conflict within periphery nations, he attributed a crucial role to trade and foreign 
investment in supporting institutional structures which cemented existing relationships of 
exploitation and contributed to political instability.   
 
Galtung’s core and periphery theory was further developed by Wallerstein’s (1979) who introduced 
the concept of the ‘semi-peripheral state’.  According to Wallerstein, semi-peripheral states played 
a key role in the capitalist system, on account of their ability to absorb products of richer nations.  
However, Wallerstein argued, there was no guarantee for the future prosperity of the nations and 
no evidence that these nations would benefit from a future expansion of trade.    In his chapter 
Dependence within and Interdependent World (1979, p.71) , Wallerstein specifically argued:  
 
In a system of unequal exchange, the semiperipheral country stands between in terms of 
the kinds of products it exports and in terms of the wage levels and profit margins it knows.  
Furthermore, it trades or seeks trade in both directions, in one mode with the periphery 
and in the opposite with the core.  Whereas at any given moment, the more balanced 
trade a core country or a peripheral country can engage in, the better off it is in absolute 
terms, it is often in the interest of the semiperipheral country to reduce external trade, 
even if balanced, since one of the major ways in which the aggregate profit margin can be 
increased is to capture an increasingly large portion of the home market for its home 
products. (emphasis in the original) 
 
 
Wallerstein was not only reluctant to accept the assumption that foreign investment and trade will 
have a positive effects on the recipient economy, but went as far as to argue that  foreign 
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investment which was led primarily by the needs of the developed country was destined to be 
detrimental to the recipient economy.  
 
While the structuralist analysis of inequality has ceased to attract the attention of mainstream 
scholarship on development,  a series of more recent  papers have borrowed heavily from some of 
the core notions of this literature.  A striking example of this is the work of Moran whose notion of 
benign and malign foreign investment relies heavily on earlier ideas about the potentially 
undesirable effect on unconstrained trade.  In his book FDI and Development: A New Policy 
Agenda for Developing Countries and Economies in Transition, Moran (1998, p. 20) argues that: 
 
Instead of filling the gap between savings and investment, Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) may lower domestic savings and investment by extracting rents and 
siphoning off the capital through preferred access to local capital markets and local 
supplies of foreign exchange. Instead of closing the gap between investment and 
foreign exchange, they might drive domestic producers out of business and substitute 
imported inputs. The MNE may reinvest in the same or related industries in the host 
country and extend its market power. The repatriation of profits might drain capital 
from the host country. MNEs’ use of “inappropriate” capital intensive technologies 
may produce small labour elites while consigning many workers to the ranks of the 
unemployed. Their tight control over technology, higher management functions and 
export channels may prevent the beneficial spillovers and externalities hoped for in 
more optimistic scenarios.   
 
Implicit in Moran’s analysis is the assumption that, rather than contributing to institutional 
development and productivity, certain types of FDI have the potential to undermine existing 
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institutional growth trajectories and, in so doing, forestall future economic growth and 
development.   
 
Although analyses of the type presented by Moran still represents a minority view amongst 
development economists, it is interesting to note that even some researchers involved in 
contemporary international policy making have started to adopt a critical perspective on the 
institutional impact of foreign investment.  One example of this are the economists Hausmann and 
Fernandez-Arias (2000) who presented a paper to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, 
Inter-American Development Bank and Inter-American Investment Corporation which noted that 
“the view that capital inflows tend to take the form of FDI – share of FDI in total liabilities tends to 
be higher – in countries that are safer, more promising and with better institutions and policies 
was misleading”.  Specifically Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias found that, while some capital flows 
tended to target countries that were safer, more developed, more open, more stable and had 
better and advanced institutions and financial markets, the share of FDI in total capital flows to 
these countries tended to be lower that to less stable regions.  This analysis not only suggested 
that FDI often targeted countries that were riskier, poorer, more volatile and more closed, but also 
that foreign investment quite possibly contributed to regional instability.   
 
Collectively these alternative approaches to foreign investment suggest a model of trade and 
development which differs radically in its outcomes from the neo-institutionalist paradigm.  
Applying the notion of malign investment to Rodrik’s framework, it can be argued that certain 
types of investment (here denoted as mFDI for malign FDI) can weaken existing institutions, while 
being themselves attracted to institutionally weaker environments. This potentially vicious cycle of 
institutional erosion and malign FDI inflows, in turn, is likely to adversely affect the domestic 
productive capacity of the recipient country productivity and, ultimately, its wealth (see Figure 3).   
 
 18
 
 
Figure 3) Malign investment and the erosion of domestic capacities 
 
Income 
 
                                                                        - 
Endogenous       factor endowments  productivity 
                                                            -        - 
 
Partly                                                                     - 
endogenous     mFDI       -  institutions 
 
 
Exogenous                                  geography 
 
 
While there is no conclusive empirical study which documents the institution-eroding effects of 
malign investment, there is ample anecdotal evidence on how developing and transition countries 
suffered from institutional disintegration and political instability as a consequence of FDI (see, e.g., 
Marriott and Muttitt, 2005).  This pattern appears to be particularly pronounced where these 
investments centre on primary and/or extractive industries at the costs of the recipient country’s 
secondary and tertiary sectors.   
 
The remaining sections of this paper will examine firstly, some of the key characteristics of FDI in 
former Soviet states.  Secondly, it will seek analyse the potential link between FDI and political 
instability in some post-Soviet states.   
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FORMER SOVIET STATES 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the FDI performance of its former constituents has been 
patchy.  Table 3 lists absolute figures for FDI inflows into former USSR countries from 1997 to 
2005.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, this data indicates a massive acceleration of FDI inflows into the 
 19
Baltic countries in the run-up to their EU accession.   By contrast, a number of former Soviet states 
with significant levels of industrial development, such as Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine, either 
have experienced no significant increases in FDI inflows, or have received FDI inflows which are 
disproportionately low given their level of industrial development and population size; particularly 
in comparison with the Baltic states.1 The two oil producing Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan, stand out in terms of FDI inflows and FDI growth with FDI figures for recent 
exceeding all other former Soviet states, including the Baltics, with the sole of exception of Russia.   
This contrasts dramatically with the other Central Asian countries, Armenia, Georgia, Kyryzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which have experienced negligible FDI inflows.   
 
Table 3) FDI inflows in million US dollar 
 Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, $m* 
Years Country 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1. Former USSR Countries 
1. 1. Central & Eastern Europe: 
1. Belarus 352 203 444 119 96 247 172 164 305 
2. Moldova 79 76 38 129 156 132 78 154 225 
3. Russia 4865 2761 3309 2714 2469 3461 7958 15444 14600 
4. Ukraine 623 743 496 595 792 693 1424 1715 7808e 
1.2. Central Asia: 
5. Armenia 52 221 122 104 70 144 157 217 220 
6. Azerbaijan 1115 1023 510 129 227 1392 3285 3556 1680 
7. Georgia 243 265 82 131 110 165 340 499 450 
8. Kazakhstan 1321 1152 1472 1283 2823 2590 2092 4113 1738 
9. Kyrgyzstan 84 109 44 -2 5 5 46 175 47 
10. Tajikistan 18 25 21 22 9 36 14 272 54 
11.Turkmenistan 108 62 89 131 150 100 100e -15e 62e 
12. Uzbekistan 167 140 121 73 570 65 70e 1e 45e 
1.3. Baltic Countries/ New EU Countries: 
13. Estonia 267 581 305 387 542 284 919 1049 2853 
14. Latvia 521 357 347 410 164 254 292 699 632 
15. Lithuania 355 926 486 379 446 732 179 773 1009 
* Source: UNCTAD, (2003-2006), World Investment Report. 
e Estimates 
 
 
While it is obvious that in absolute figures, as well as in per capita terms, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan, vastly outperformed other former Soviet states, it is important to note that even these 
                                        
1 This analysis excludes the most recent figure for the Ukraine which is a potentially unreliable estimate. Deleted:  is
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countries have experienced dramatic fluctuations in terms of the amounts of FDI they have 
received during this period.    This pronounced instability of year-by-year FDI inflows is depicted in 
Figure 4, in which recent figures for Russia and Ukraine have been excluded in order to provide a 
more readable scaling of the trend lines.   Apparently, in as far as there has been substantial 
investment in former Soviet states, this has centred on a very limited number of countries, who 
themselves could not rely on stable and regular inflows of foreign capital.   
 
Figure 4)   FDI inflows in million US dollar 
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Although there is a long history of complaints among potential foreign investors about the 
vagueness of government attitudes to foreign investment, the existing differences in FDI inflows 
can only be insufficiently  explained by the attitudes and actions of these post-Soviet states.   
Rather, the unequal regional distribution of FDI in the post-soviet territories appears to be  
primarily determined by the presence, or absence, of natural resources.  
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Hitherto, natural resource and food industries have been the most attractive targets for foreign 
investment. In Russia, the fuel and food sectors lead in terms of share of total FDI inflows with 
23% and 28%, respectively. They are followed by trade, transport and telecommunication. The 
machinery, timber and other sectors, meanwhile, have hardly received any investment at all. Large 
scale investments in the oil and gas sectors have included about 50 joint ventures and involved 
American, British, French, German, Canadian, Japanese and other companies. The scale of 
projects in the food sector is significant as well with foreign companies  showing an interest in 
pastries and meat industries as well as the production of non-alcohol drinks, beer and tobacco 
(Yacheistova, 2001),  
 
As an example of an industrialised state which has attracted only limited amounts of FDI, Ukraine 
had attracted less than 6 billion dollars in FDI by 2004, which comprised only about a seventh of 
the officially estimated 40 billion dollars required for restructuring its economy. A detailed analysis 
of FDI flows indicates that these were quite small and often used inefficiently. For example, 
foreign investment inflows in Ukraine during the first half of the year 2001 were 12.4% less then 
the amount of FDI inflows during the corresponding period of the year 2000. As in Russia, foreign 
investors targeted the Ukrainian food and agricultural processing industry. The FDI share into this 
sector comprised 19.8% of the total investment inflows. Wholesale and sale mediation attracted 
13.9% of investment. Investment into machine-building industry, finance sectors and transport 
were equal to 8.2%, 7.9% and 6.8% of total investment inflows, respectively (State Statistics 
Committee of Ukraine, 2002).  
 
In Azerbaijan the largest share of FDI was received by the country’s main industry – oil. The high 
level of investment in this area, however, has hardly benefited other sectors.  For instance, amidst 
complaints about corruption and unfair practices by officials, as well as declining traffic volumes, 
several international airlines have abandoned their operations in the country.  Specifically, during 
the period of 1999-2000, six different companies, Austrian airlines, Pakistan Air, British Airways, 
KLM, Lufthansa and Emirates have ceased operations in Baku’s Bina International Airport (WMRC, 
2004a).  
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In Kazakhstan, which, by 2004 had received seventeen billion dollars in FDI since independence, 
there is evidence that foreign investment had a de-stabilising effect on the local economy, which 
has led to increased frictions between the states and foreign investors.  Thus, a number of high 
profile international investors, such as TengizChevroil, Canada’s Hurricane Hydrocarbons Ltd and 
the Carachaganak Petroleum Operating Company, have faced Environment Ministry accusations of 
opaque sales and environmental breaches. Moreover, a newly enacted Investment Law, approved 
in 2003, stipulates that new contracts negotiated with foreign companies will no longer contain a 
“grandfather clause” that shield the company from regulatory and tax changes. The law also 
prevents companies from resorting to international arbitration if the Kazakh government forbids 
this. Furthermore, the law eliminates preferences for foreign investors with a view towards 
“creating a level playing field between domestic and foreign companies” (WMRC, 2004b).  
. 
Both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, meanwhile, appear to suffer from a rise of governmental 
authoritarianism and are even showing ‘dynastic’ tendencies. In October, 2003, for instance, for 
the first time, the rule of a post-Soviet state was passed from father to son as a result of 
Azerbaijan’s presidential elections. In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s eldest 
daughter, the country’s biggest media baron, is creating a new political party and is believed to be 
groomed for the succession of her father.  These, and many other, events are indicative of the 
potentially adverse effects of the newly found foreign-sponsored wealth.  
 
 
FOREING INVESTMENT, CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY: AN EMPRICAL ANALYSIS 
Today, any evidence regarding the link between foreign investment and increases in corruption 
and political instability remains largely anecdotal.  Nevertheless, as far as former Soviet states 
other than the Baltics are concerned it is difficult to find instances in which foreign investment 
appears to have had a positive impact on the recipient countries political institutions.  Put simply, 
FDI inflows have increased in a number of former Soviet states, and where this has been the case, 
so typically has corruption. 
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Figures  5 to 7 depict  scatterplots of the Corruption Perception Index rank and FDI inflows for the 
period from 1999 to 2005 (Transparency International, 2006).   The Corruption Perception Index is 
collected by the international voluntary association Transparency International and ranks countries 
according to a number of criteria, including bond ratings,  as those which are internationally 
perceived as most or least corrupt.  
 
As concerns the scatterplot for Russia, it can be noted that the country experienced a small decline 
in its corruption ranking alongside a decline in FDI.  This situation, however, changed from 2002, 
when a massive increase in FDI inflows was accompanied by a modest increase in the country’s 
corruption rank.  Between 2004 and 2005, lastly, a small decline in FDI inflows occurred which was 
accompanied by a pronounced increase in the country’s corruption perception ranking. 
 
Figure 5) Russia: Scatterplot ofCorruption Perception Index rank and FDI inflows, 1999-2005  
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This pattern is closely mirrored by the scatterplot for Azerbaijan.  Here too an initial decrease in 
FDI was accompanied by a decline in the country’s corruption ranking.  From 2001 onwards, 
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2003 2004
2005
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however, Azerbaijan experienced both a massive increase in FDI inflows and in its corruption 
ranking.  This situation changed only between 2004 and 2005, when the annual FDI more than 
halved and the country’s corruption perception ranking declined from 140th to 137th.  
 
Figure 6) Azerbaijan: Scatterplot of Corruption Perception Index rank and FDI inflows, 1999-2005 
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The scatterplot for Kazakhstan deviates from the previous two patterns in several minor respects. 
Initially, Kazakhstan’s corruption ranking decreased alongside a decline in FDI.  From 2000 to 2001, 
both FDI inflows and the country’s corruption rank increased.  This was followed by a period from 
2001 to 2003, when FDI inflows decrease while the corruption rank continues to increase.  
Between 2003 and 2004 a massive increase in FDI inflows took place which was again 
accompanied by an increase in the country’s corruption perception rank, this time from 100th to 
103rd . The period from 2004 to 2005, lastly, saw a decrease in FDI alongside a continuing increase 
in the corruption index, this time to 107th.  
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Figure 7) Kazakhstan: Scatterplot ofCorruption Perception Index rank and FDI inflows, 1999-2005 
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Taken together these analyses lend limited support to the hypothesis that increased inflows in FDI 
are likely to be linked to increases in corruption and possibly political instability in the recipient 
country.  Needless  to say, the simultaneous occurrence of increased FDI inflows together with 
increased corruption, if this is indeed measured by this index, does not in itself imply a causality.  
What it does suggest, however, is that FDI has not had, as previously often assumed, a 
corruption-reducing effect on post-Soviet recipient states.  
 
The remaining sections test the relationship between country risk indicators as reported by World 
Market Research Centre (WMRC) country reports and various economic variables (including FDI) 
for the above listed countries. This analysis deliberately excludes the three Baltic states, whose 
economic development was affected relatively early on by their eventual succession to the 
European Union (Hunya, 2004). 
 
1999 
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This analysis is conducted via a pooled regression analysis where data for twelve countries 
(namely the Central and Eastern European States of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, and 
the Central Asian Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and nine years (1997-2005) are investigated in terms of three 
models.  These include Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) and 
the General Least Squares Error (GLSE) Model.  Of these models, the LSDV model can be 
considered the most reliable since the OLS model is likely to produce overinflated t values on 
account of serial correlation, and the GLSE is likely to underestimate the significance of coefficient  
(Stimson, 1985). 
 
In the following analysis, test are conducted for the WMRC variables, Overall Country Risk (OCR), 
Economic Risk (ER) and Legal Risk (LR).2   World Market Research Centre (WMRC) defines:  
-  Economic Risk (ER): as degree of market orientation, policy consistency and forward 
planning, diversity and resilience of the economy, macroeconomic fundamentals;  
- Legal Risk (LR): as a measure of a country’s legislation, transparency, independence, and 
experience; and  
- Overall Country (OCR): as a composite indicator of these risks plus Tax Risk, Operational 
Risk and Security Risk.  
 
Despite the lack of more detailed data and the fact that these risk variables are based on a 
number of assumptions, the relationship between these variables and FDI is remarkably stable; 
with FDI having a significant positive (risk increasing) coefficient for most of the relevant LSDV 
model outputs. 
                                        
2 It should be noted that this analysis has excluded a fourth WMRC variable, namely political risk.  The 
reason for this is that this variable shows a strong path dependency in the sense that the stability of 
democratic governance systems has strong historical determinants and appears to change only marginally 
over time.  For the purpose of our argument regarding the potentially malign effects of FDI, both economic 
and legal risk appear to be the more suitable variables.   
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The first part of the analysis utilizes WMRC’s score for ‘Overall Country Risk’ (OCR) as dependent 
variable (Table 4).   Overall this analysis performs well for both the LSDV and the GLSE variant.  
For the more reliable LSDV variant, 53.1% of the total variation is explained by the five 
independent variables, ‘FDI as % of GDP’,  ‘Government Debt as % of GDP’, ‘GDP per capita’, 
‘Unemployment rate’ and ‘Trade Balance as % GDP’.   Of the independent variables both 
‘Government debt’ and the ‘Unemployment rate’ have a significant, risk increasing,  effect on 
overall country risk at the .05 level of significance or above.  ‘FDI as % of GDP’ also has a risk 
increasing effect, but here the significance is more marginal (.12 level of significance). 
 
Table 4) Overall Country Risk (OCR) 
Model     OLS   LSDV    GLSE 
 
Indep Variables 
  
 FDI as % of GDP  .0295   .0249   .0065 
     (1.915)   (1.544)   (.858) 
 Gov Debt as % GDP  .0106   .0197   .0048  
     (4.160)   (5.281)   (2.885) 
 GDP per capita   .0003   .0002   .0001 
     (3.275)   (1.119)   (0.644) 
 Unemployment rate  .0185   .0665   .0387 
     (1.279)   (2.058)   (3.249) 
 Trade Balance as % GDP      -.0065   -.0019           -.0021 
     (-.965)   (-.0168)  (-.512)  
 R square adjusted  28.9   53.1   21.5 
 
 
While it is probably not surprising that government debt and unemployment would increase the 
overall riskiness or decrease its overall stability, it is interesting to note that, contrary to the 
assumptions of the benign model of FDI, the variable ‘FDI as % of GDP’ also exerts a negative 
influence on ‘Overall Country Risk’.    
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This pattern of a risk increasing role of FDI is confirmed for the dependent variable ‘Economic Risk’ 
which is examined in the next set of models (Table 5).  Again this analysis performs well for the 
LSDV model which yields an adjusted  R Square value of 46.4%.     In this model, ‘Government 
debt’ and the ‘Unemployment rate’ have again a significant, risk increasing, effect ‘Economic Risk’ 
at the .05 level of significance or above.   ‘FDI as % of GDP’, meanwhile also has a significant risk 
increasing effects, however, at the lower .01 level of significance. 
 
Economic Risk (ER) 
Model     OLS   LSDV    GLSE 
 
Indep Variables 
  
 FDI as % of GDP  .0169   .0314   .0068  
     (1.060)   (1.744)   (.915) 
 Gov Debt as % GDP  .0109   .0191   .0027  
     (4.150)   (4.597)   (1.592) 
 GDP per capita   .0003   .0001   -.0001 
     (2.717)   (1.080)   (-1.729) 
 Unemployment rate  .0300   .0768   .0530 
     (1.999)   (2.1297)  (4.175) 
 Trade Balance as % GDP          -.0112   -.0037           -.0023 
     (-1.596)  (-.301)   (-.558)  
 R square adjusted  30.0   46.4   21.6  
 
 
Perhaps the most interesting results are gained by re-examining this model with the third 
dependent variable of ‘Legal Risk’.  This variable, which assesses a country’s system of legal and 
commercial governance, probably most closely mirrors the assumptions of the previously discussed 
opposing models of benign versus malign foreign investment, as it focuses on country-specific 
governance competencies.   Again the result of these models closely mirrors those of the previous 
analysis, with the LSDV model performing well and yielding an adjusted R square value of 48.9%.  
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However, in case of the dependent variable ‘Legal Risk’,  the independent variables ‘Government 
debt’ , the ‘Unemployment rate’ and ‘FDI as % of GDP’ have a significant, risk increasing,  effect at 
the .05 level of significance.   The significance of the ‘FDI as % GDP’ in this model in particular, 
lends strong support to the previously discussed hypothesis of a malign effect FDI in terms of 
political stability in the context of post-Soviet states.   
  
 
Legal Risk (LR) 
Model     OLS   LSDV    GLSE 
 
Indep Variables 
  
 FDI as % of GDP  .0263   .0337   .0126  
     (1.494)   (1.916)   (1.552) 
 Gov Debt as % GDP  .0070   .0197   .0031  
     (2.408)   (4.7064)  (1.540) 
 GDP per capita   .0004   .0012    .0001 
     (3.587)   (1.494)   (1.316) 
 Unemployment rate  .0070   .0363   .0250 
     (.419)   (1.003)   (1.822) 
 Trade Balance as % GDP           -.0054   -.0047           .0002 
     (-.694)   (-.037)   (0.033)  
 R square adjusted  32.0   48.9   30.1 
 
 
Although the previous regression analyses are inevitably affected by any weaknesses in the 
underlying data, they strongly point to the possibility that, at least for the period during which 
these countries were examined, FDI was having an overall destabilising effect on domestic 
institutional competencies.   While this analysis does not necessarily the confirm the hypothesis of 
a malign effect of foreign investment, it certainly contests the conventional assumption that FDI 
will positively impact on the institutional structures and the stability of recipient countries.        
CONCLUSION 
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The paper has sought to examine the conventional assumption of a benign role of foreign 
investment, together with its opposing hypothesis of malign FDI in the context of post- Soviet 
states.   Although our results point to the possibility that, on the whole, foreign investment may 
have had negative effects on the region, this analysis must necessarily be interpreted with caution.  
Specifically some of the factors which limit the generalisability of these findings include the fact 
that the regression analysis in particular covers a limited time frame during which some parts of 
the region, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan were, ab initio, characterised by involvement in conflict 
and instability.   Secondly, during the period examined here a very large amount of foreign 
investment was concentrated on a small number of natural resource-endowed states, which could 
have a distorting effect on the overall data analysis.    
 
Despite these caveats it is probably valid to note that this analysis throws doubt on the, often 
politically motivated, advocacy of FDI which  presupposes that the interests of multinational 
investors are identical with those of recipient states.   Without more concrete evidence in its 
support, the assumption of a benign effect of foreign investment is no more than speculation, 
irrespective of how many international organisations pay lip service to this; and what is more, it is 
an assumption that needs to be very carefully and critically examined.   
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